The ontology of interoceptive sensations in the focus of modern philosophy of mind and empirical data of cognitive science

Abstract

The article is focused on ontological issues related to inner-body sensations in the context of cognitive sciences and modern philosophy of mind. Initially, the concept of interoception was limited to physiological processes and reactions associated with internal organs. Never­theless, further developments in cognitive science led to a reassessment of the role of bodily characteristics in cognitive activity, which facilitated the exploration of interoception in va­rious discourses. Within contemporary theories of cognitive science (such as “embodied cognition”, “predictive processing”), interoception is an important component of high-level mental activity. The article also discusses methodological and philosophical aspects of inte­roception, including the relationship between physiological processes and psychological fac­tors in the perception of inner-body sensations. As a result, the specific experience of intero­ception is analyzed in the context of the phenomenal aspects of consciousness. This study compares the qualitative aspects of interoception and exteroception experience. The uncer­tain ontological status of interoceptive sensations stimulates their discussion within debates about the nature of qualia. In this article, arguments are also presented in favor of the inter­relation and complementarity of the concepts of interoception and qualia in the context of phenomenal consciousness, leading to the conclusion of the qualitative nature of intero­ception within the realm of subjective first-person experience.