The critical analysis the Penrose–Hameroff theory of consciousness. Part 2

Authors

  • David I. Dubrovsky Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.21146/2413-9084-2017-22-2-89-102

Keywords:

consciousness, a subjective reality, physical and mental, information, protomental, quantum mechanics, theory of consciousness, objective reduction (OR)

Abstract

The Penrose–Hameroff theory of consciousness for the past 20 years has not been confirmed. Its main provisions are refuted by such major specialists as St. Hawking, A.Shimoni, etc. Despite this, it is advertised as a significant scientific achievement in explaining the nature of consciousness. The article emphasizes the inconsistency of the explanation of consciousness from the standpoint of radical physicalism. The paradigm of functionalism is considered, on the basis of which the adequate theoretical means of research of biological and social self-organizing systems are developed. In this respect, the possibilities of the information approach in explaining the connection between the phenomena of consciousness and brain processes and mental causality are shown. The experiments that were proposed by Hameroff in order to confirm the theory of consciousness and the idea of quantum immortality of the soul are critically examined.

 

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Published

2018-02-16

Issue

Section

Epistemology and cognitive sciences