Normativity in philosophy of mind

Abstract

The paper deals with the problem of normativity in the philosophy of mind. It points out that the normativity of conscious experience has long been ignored in the discipline. This is largely due to the fact that philosophers paid attention primarily to the metaphysical aspects of mind. The work also notes that the turn to the epistemology of mind makes it important to study the normativity of mental states. Such research can help us not only to clarify a number of epistemological questions, but also to solve some metaphysical questions. In particular, an inquiry into the problem of normativity can justify an acceptance of externalism in the philosophy of mind. In the paper, the problem of normativity in the philosophy of mind is considered through the viewpoint of the rule-following problem, posed by Wittgenstein. It demonstrates that any internalist understanding of the content of mental states either ignores the normative aspect of conscious experience or faces the skeptical paradox formulated by Wittgenstein. The only way to avoid these difficulties is to adopt the externalist view about the content of mental states advocated by John McDowell. According to this position, the content of mental states is understood as an objective state of affairs, which can function as a reason for the conscious activity of the subject.