Does consciousness have an ontological status?

Abstract

The question of the ontological status of consciousness traditionally accompanies the philos­ophy of consciousness. In modern conditions, it is often initiated by representatives of ana­lytical philosophy and assumes the nature of the discussion of a mind-body problem. The author of the article proceeds from the fact that in the history of philosophy, appeal to the problem of the ontology of consciousness began with the discussion of the specific properties of mental constructs used to describe reality. On this basis, the initial contrast be­tween the ideal and material arises, and consciousness appears as a manifestation of the ideal. With the birth of experimental science, philosophy of the New Age and Psychology, the condemnation of a psychophysical problem is actualized, the solution of which was to open the way to comprehend the nature of consciousness. In modern conditions, cognitive studies are one of the grounds for actualizing the psychophysical problem, focused on the study of brain and neural networks. The article shows that the study of biophysical instru­ments of consciousness is not enough to understand its nature. The author relies on the cul­tural-historical (cultural-activity) concept of the formation of consciousness, which focuses on the formation of symbolic behavior as its attribrutive property.