“Communism” maxim in Robert Merton’s code of ethics and its effect in the epistemological discourse of the traditional society

Abstract

The article examines one of the maxims of the code of scientific ethos, formulated in 1942 by R.K. Merton, namely “communism” (translated in Russian also as “communalism” and “collectivism”). Although the Merton Code was derived from the study of relationships among European scientists since the 17th century, the author substantiates the possibility of using this maxim to characterize the communication that develops between the subjects of epistemological discourse in traditional society, primarily in the civilizations of the ancient and medieval East (ancient Egypt and Babylon, India, China, the Arab-Muslim world). The epistemological dimension of “communism” is rendered relevant, provided that the re- search community, a community of researchers, is united by common cognitive and professional attitudes. This commune covers not only real-life people performing in various cognitive roles (pioneers, commentators, experts, analysts or popularizers), but also individuals represented virtually. The latter are either the authors of the surviving works, determining the format and problem field of definite epistemological fragment, or future successors of the study, which will connect to it after a while. Violations of ethical principles implicitly perceived by this maxim (such as full mutual trust and equality among study participants, respect for results achieved by others, the priority of common goals over personal competition, etc.) are perceived as treasonous to the spirit of science and behavior worthy of censure. Despite interpersonal and inter-group conflicts accompanying the research work, the view of knowledge as a common, communal property of a commonwealth of scientists or, at least, this team, is an important factor in the effectiveness of scientific research. On the contrary, the privatization of knowledge and its total secrecy, characteristic of periods of scientific stagnation, is accompanied by a break of contacts between the subjects of discourse and the fading of interest in cardinal, breakthrough, innovative epistemological problems.